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THE SETTLEMENT REQUIREMENT IN GENERAL
ASSISTANCE*
DANIEL R. MANDELKERt
But the stranger that dwelleth with you shall be unto you as
one born among you, and thou shalt love him as thyself; for ye
were strangers in the land of Egypt....
LEvITICUS 19: 34
INTRODUCTION
A tradition which glorifies the westward migration of an entire
nation, but which penalizes the migrant family or individual by
countenancing the existence of a system of social welfare based orN
local residence, may seem a paradox to the casual observer of the
American scene. Yet, strangely enough, both the pioneering spirit and
the institution of settlement are part of the English heritage to which
this country has fallen heir. That settlement laws may be out of keep-
ing with the needs of a society which thrives on change and fluidity,
has not yet fully penetrated the American social conscience.
Settlement requirements are characteristic of general assistance,
more commonly known as general relief, or poor relief. This program,
the direct descendant of the provisions for aid to the needy found in
the Elizabethan Poor Law, is the residual program of public assistance
in this country. It is responsible for all persons in need who are not
eligible for any of the other programs of public assistance or social
insurance and, in many areas, it also supplements grants and awards
made under these other programs., General assistance is still the
* The second part of this article will appear in the February 1956 issue of
the WASHINGTON UNIvERsITY LAW QUARTERLY. This article consists of part of a
chapter, with some revisions, of a thesis submitted to the Law School of Yale
University in partial satisfaction of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of
the Science of Law (J.S.D.). Work on this thesis was undertaken by the author
during his tenure of a fellowship granted by the Fund for the Advancement of
Education. However, it represents the independent work of the author and he is
solely responsible for it.
t Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University, Indianapolis Division.
1. Categorical assistance, which is to be distinguished from general assistance,
somprehends the programs of old age assistance, aid to the blind, aid to dependent
children, and aid to the permanently and totally disabled. These programs are
inanced by states and local governments with federal financial help, are state-
administered or state-supervised, and must conform to minimum standards pre-
scribed by federal statute in order to qualify for federal aid. For a review of
categorical or special assistance, see Geddes, Programs of Public Assistance in
the Unite. States, 70 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 132 (1950). For a brief review of
general assistance, see Mandelker, The American Poor Laws: A LegislativeBackwater, 41 A.B.A.J. 567 (1955).
Perhaps because of their antiquity, the constitutionality of settlement provinins
has neve" been seriously questioned. People ex rel. Heydenreich v. Lyons, 374 Ill.
567, 80 N.E.2d 46 (1940), 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 544 (1941) ; cf. Attorney General v.
Board of Public Welfare, 313 Mass. 675, 48 N.E.2d 689 (1943) (settlement may
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fiscal and administrative responsibility of the state and local govern-
ments, and often is locally administered without state supervision.
Settlement in: the locality to which an application is made has, ever
since 1662, been a requirement to the receipt of general assistance.
Through time, however, there have been modifications in the settlement
system. For one thing, some jurisdictions no longer have settlement
statutes, though in these instances the requirement may have been
reinstituted by regulation.2 In addition, most states either have
statutes which authorize emergency aid to nonresidents who are sick
or injured, or statutes under which aid is to be given to nonresidents
on the same basis that it is given to residents.3 In the last two situa-
tions the settlement laws operate not so much to determine whether
the applicant is entitled to assistance, but rather to allocate the ulti-
mate financial responsibility for the cost of the aid that is given.4 The
otherwise restrictive effects of the settlement laws have also been
mitigated in some jurisdictions by statutes which require only state
rather than local residence as a prerequisite to general assistance.
In spite of these modifications, however, the basic structure of the
settlement laws still continues to be important to general assistance
administration, especially in view of the fact that aid is often denied
to non-settled persons as a matter of practice. This article will ex-
amine the law of settlement, consider its implications for persons
applying for help, and determine whether and to what extent it be-
longs in a general assistance program.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The first English settlement act was not passed until 1662, more
than half a century after the codification of the poor law in 1597. The
1662 statute5 not only restored the settlement system to the poor law
but, for the first time, provided that any person "likely to be charge-
able" to the parish as a poor person, who did not have a forty-day
constitutionally be abandoned as a requirement for aid to dependent children);
Merrimack County v. Grafton County, 63 N.H. 550, 4 Atl. 390 (1886). See Annot.,
132 A.L.R. 518 (1941).
2. There appear to be no statutory settlement provisions in Arizona (local
program), Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Missouri
(state program), New Mexico (state program), South Carolina (state program),
Virginia (state program), and Washington. However, in Delaware, to take one
example, a two-year residence requirement has been imposed administratively.
Letter from Kenneth C. Lambert, Chief, Delaware Department of Public Welfare,
Division of Public Assistance, to the author, Sept. 8, 1954. Besides, some of the
statutes imply that aid is to be given only to residents even though the settlement
requirement is not stated explicitly. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 83-306 (1947)
(counties to support their "own poor").
3. For an example of the former, see COLO. Rav. STAT. ANN. c. 36, art. 10,
§ 10 (1953). of the latter, see ILL. ANN. STAT. c 23. § 439-6 (Supp. 1954).
4. See Attorney General v. Board of Public Welfare, 313 Mass. 675, 48 N.E.2d
689 (1943).
5. 13 & 14 CAR. 2, c. 12 (1662).
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residence, could be removed to his place of settlement., The only ex-
ception was the individual who could afford to take a residence at a
high rent.7 For this reason, the statute in fact opened the way for
proceedings by which the low-income worker could be removed to his
place of residence and prevented from migrating to seek better eco-
nomic opportunity.8
As is the case with other important provisions of the early English
poor laws, the reasons for the enactment of the settlement law of 1662
have never been fully explained9 Perhaps the most plausible explana-
tion is that it was part of the new punitive attitude toward the relief
of the poor which first made its appearance in the middle of the seven-
teenth century. 10 At any rate, the institution of settlement came with
the colonists to the New World. Because of the difficulties of provid-
ing for a physical subsistence, the English practice of dumping un-
desirables in America, and hostility to the religious deviate, the
colonies early adopted settlement laws which were quite severe in
operation. 1 In Massachusetts, for example, settlement could be ac-
quired only by vote of the town meeting. Ultimately the possession
of property was a condition, coupled with a long residence require-
ment. In addition, the system of "warning out" was almost universal. 2
6. The historical material in this section is based primarily on S. & B. WEBB,
ENGLISH POOR LAW HISTORY: PART I 314-49 (1927), which reviews the historical
material at great length. See also FALK, SETTLEMENT LAWS: A MAJOR PROBLEM
IN SOCIAL WELFARE 3-6 (1948); MILES, AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC WELFARE
29-31 (1949); 1 NICHOLLS, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH POOR LAW 279-87 (1898);
Riesenfeld, The Formative Era of American Public Assistance Law, 43 CALIF. L.
REv. 175 (1955).
7. The statute was applicable to any person settling "in any tenement under the
yearly value of ten pounds."
8. A complaint for the removal of an individual was to be filed with the localjustices of the peace, who exercised both administrative and judicial functions
during that period. See FORDHAM, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 1-6 (1949).
9. icholls contends that the law was adopted as a local measure, at the
behest of London and Westminster, to help stem the flow of poor persons to
these cities from the outlying regions. The preamble to the act supports this
theory. In addition, laws were enacted against the erection of additional houses
in London. NICHOLLS, op. cit. supra note 6, at 280-82.
10. See TAWNzY, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM 216-26 (Mentor Books
ed. 1947).
11. The history of the early American laws has been traced in several court
opinions. See. e.g., Town of Plainville v. Town of Milford, 119 Conn. 380, 177
At. 188 (1935) ; Matter of Porter, 68 Misc. 124, 124 N.Y. Supp. 162 (County Ct.
1910); Exeter v. Warwick, 1 RI. 63 (1834). These cases note that the early
laws were intended to keep out undesirables. For representative discussions of
the early American history, see BROWN, PUBLIC RELIEF 1929-1939, at 11-13 (1940) ;
BRUNO, TRENDS IN SOCIAL WORK 124-25 (1948); FALK. op. cit. supra note 6,
at 6-8; Wisner, The Puritan Background of the New England Poor Laws, 19
Soc. Smv. RRV. 381 (1945); 20 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1941). Some of the states
which were settled later did not inherit the harshness of the English system,
either because of different traditions or because the exigencies of a new-found
colony were not present. See, e.g., WISNER, PUBLIC WELFARE ADMINISTRATION IN
LOUISIANA 24-26 (1930).
12. The early warning out laws are discussed in BENTON, WARNING 'OUT IN
NZW ENGLAND (1911).
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A newcomer could not secure a settlement if he were warned to leave
the town. If he did not leave he was subject, as in England, to being
whipped or driven out of the community.
CONTEMPORARY MIGRATION PATTERNS
To a certain extent,' the early colonial settlement laws may be justi-
fied as necessary for self-preservation. Whether these laws still serve
a useful purpose today is another question. An investigation into this
problem first requires an examination of present-day population move-
ments, particularly as they affect the individual who falls in need of
assistance.
America has always had a fluid population, and this is no less true
today than it was at an earlier time. For example, in the war and
postwar period from 1940 to 1947, twenty-five million Americans
changed their residence, either from one county to another within a
state, or from one state to another, and this volume of migration
shows little sign of lessening.13 Contemporary migration patterns
appear-to be the result of population shifts away from the Southern
states, west to the states of the Pacific Coast, and from rural to urban
areas.14 In part, this movement is a consequence of emigration from
chronic-depressed areas, such as the old cotton belt, the Southern
Appalachian coal plateau, and the Great Plains.15 It is also part of
the continuing shifts in population which have come in the wake of
increasing urbanization and the technological agricultural revolution. 0
The ranks of the migrants are also swelled by the large group of
migratory laborers in farming. One recent survey estimates that
1,400,000 people now derive their income from this source. 7 The
reasons for so many transient workers in agriculture have not been
13. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULA ION RE-
PORTS, SERIES P-20, No. 14, INTERNAL MIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: APRIL
1940 TO APRIL 1947 (1948); U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-20, No. 49, MOBILITY OF THE POPULATION
OF THE UNITED STATES: APRIL 1952 TO APRIL 1953 (1953). In recent years,
however, the volume of intercounty migration has decreased somewhat. For a
recent collection of essays analyzing geographic and other forms of labor mobility,
see LABOR MOBILITY AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY (Webbink ed. 1954).
14. In the period from 1940 to 1947 rural areas lost 3.2 million people and the
South 1.5 million, while the West gained 2.0 million. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS,
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-20, No. 49, op. cit.
supra note 13, at 1.
15. RYAN, MIGRATION AND SOCIAL WELFARE 18-20 (1940).
16. This would explain the farm to city shift. Shifts in the working force
should ultimately result from the relocation of various industries for market,
technological, and. other reasons. See, e.g., Woodbury, Industrial Relocation and
Urban Redevelopment, in THE FUTURE OF CITIES IN URBAN REDEVELOPMENT 105(Woodbury ed. 1953).
17. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION''ON MIGRATORY LABOR, MIGRATORY LABOR IN
AmERICAN AGRICULTURE 3 (1951). The-renort of the commission contains a good
discussion of the problem. See also La Follette, Jr., Agricultural Miqration-
Past, Present -and Future, in PROCEEDINGS OF .THE .NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
SOCIAL WORK 145 (1941). '
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easy to identify, though one factor appears to be the decreasing need
for year-round farm hands.-s Another, of course, is the harvesting
problem presented by certain agricultural commodities-the sudden
ripening of perishable crops, for example, requiring immediate, large,
but temporary working forces. 1'9
Another important factor which has contributed to population
movement is the continued specialization of tasks and skills. As a
consequence, the market for any particular talent, especially at the
professional and semiprofessional level, is limited to a few geo-
graphical areas,20 so that job-seekers are forced to move to secure
employment at the skills for which they are trained.
This delineation of migration patterns has served to indicate the
reasons why people migrate. Individuals who move in search of jobs
seem to do so because of the desire and necessity to seek better eco-
nomic opportunities and to secure a living.21 The desire to secure
public assistance does not appear to be the dominant reason as is
commonly thought, though health and other personal considerations
do constitute a factor in population movement to some areas. 22 Further
than this, it appears that the people who do move are generally the
more desirable members of the community, if any such qualitative
standard can be adopted. Migrants tend to be younger, better-edu-
cated, and better-trained as a group than the total population of the
country as a whole.23
18. The need declined by more than one-half from 1931 to 1949. PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON MIGRATORY LABOR, op. cit. supra note 17, at 12. This report
notes that the average migratory worker in 1949 had 70 days of farm work, 31
days of nonfarm work, and an average annual income of $514. Id. at 125.
19. CALIFOtNIA GOVE1NOR'S COMMITTEE TO SURVEY THE AGRICULTURAL LABOR
RESOURCER OF THE SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY, AGRICULTURAL LABOR IN THE SAN
JOAQUIN VALLEY 292-94 (1951), discusses the problem in this area of California.
This report, incidentally, contains an excellent survey, with special reference to
California, of the findings and recommendations made by the principal studies of
the m rratory labor problem in American agriculture.
20. FALK, SETTLEMENT LAWS: A MAJOR PROBLEM IN SOCIAL WELFARE 8-9
(1948).
21. Falk renorts that, of those persons moving between V-J Day (August 14,1945) rnd October 1946, 6,000,000 moved for job and 1,900,000 for housing rea-
sons. Those moving in search of a job constituted the large majority of the
total migrant group. Ibid. In the depression years of the 1930's, unemployment
and the search for a job was also found to be the greatest cause for migration.
RYAN, t. sut. pra note 15, at 10: Webb, The Transient Unemployed, in RE-
MRCH MONOGRH No. 3, at 2 (WPA 1935). Webb states that about 70% of
the migrants surveyed reported that they left in search of employment, often to.
avoid going on relief in their heme communities. Id. at 59.
22. One study reports that differential relief standards attracted only 4% or-
less of the migrants surveyed durine the 1930's. Webb, supra note 21, at
63. Westward migration for reasons of health was found in 11% of the cases.
A recent study in Louisiana indicated that old age assistance recipients do not
move to Pecu-e higher grants, but to be near relatives or state-supported medical
enters. Of the 24 parishes with a net gain in assistance recipients, 17 had a pay-
ment lowe- then the state average. A survey in New York reached similar con-
elusioYs. See FALK. op. cit. supra note 20, at 14-16.
28. During the depression period of the 1930's. for -example, it was found that
the heads of migrant families were more successful than the heads of local relier
Washington University Open Scholarship
,WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
:-.-It should also be noted that communities often do their best to
attract new residents. Most of these newcomers succeed, but the
:public appears reluctant to assume the burden of those who do not.
.One effect, then, of current population movements is the unsettling of
large numbers of persons for relief purposes for no personal fault of
-their own. The wanted thus become the unvanted, and must suffer in
part because of economic and social forces which it is beyond them
to control.21
MIGRATION AND GENERAL ASSISTANCE
The migratory worker in need is the responsibility of general as-
sistance, and discrimination against him in the administration of
-the program may be said to be one of the undesirable costs of settle-
ment laws. The practice of denying any relief to nonresidents has
-already been mentioned.2 5 The loss to society from such practices, in
'terms of physical deprivation and personality disintegration due to
want, cannot be overemphasized.2 6 In addition, relief officials still
*seek to solve the problem presented by needy nonresidents simply by
giving them bus fare to the next county, or even by personally escort-
nifigthem over the county line, with an admonition never to return.2 7
These practices, known as "dumping" or "passing on," may be aided
in some jurisdictions by the use of compulsory removal laws, or by
-the threat to use them. Even if aid is given to nonresidents, however,
it may be delayed longer than usually is the case, or given subject
t6 onerous conditions.28
- Since the primary fear which motivates discriminatory practices
families in finding work. RYAN, MIGRATION AND SOCIAL WELFARE 10 (1940).
"This, of course, may be understandable since their employability was increased
by the fact that they were younger as a group than the local population. The
statement-in the text is supported by the statistics reported in U.S. BUREAU OF
'CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMIERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-20, No. 14,
INTERNAL MIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: APRIL 1940 TO APRIL 1947, at 2-7,
14-25 (1948), which also notes that the younger professional and semiprofes-
sional wage earners were the most mobile. The composition of the migrant group
,does not seem to have changed. See U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMIERCE,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-20, No. 36, INTERNAL MIGRATION AND
KOBILITY IN THE UNITED STATES: MARCH 1949 TO MARCH 1950 (1951). However,
-during the depression, migrants seemed to be drawn more from the unskilled and
semiskilled working force. Webb, supra note 21, at 2. This may have
been due-to the greater vulnerability of such employment to economic reverses.
The statements made in the text apply to persons who move to find a permanentJobj and may not apply to agricultural and other migratory workers.
24. See ANDrRSON, MEN ON THE MovE 46 (1940) ; Ostertag, New York Revises
,and Simplifies Its Public Welfare System, 20 Soc. SERv. REv. 11 (1946).
- 25. See text supported by note 2 supra and the survey reported in GENTILE
-. HowARD, GENERAL ASSISTANCE 9-11 (1949).
- -26. ABBoTT; PunLic ASSISTANCE: AMERICAN PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 284-85(1940).
- -27.- See"GENTILE & HowARw, GENERAL ASSISTANCE 10 (1949) for a recent re-
-port.. --
28. See BURNS, THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM 343 (1949). For ex-
ample,- the nonresident- may be- made to pr6mise to return to his place of settle-
..nent upon request.
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toward nonresidents appears to be the fear of excessive costs, it is
appropriate to determine what proportion of assistance applicants is
composed of the nonresident needy. Obviously, the tremendous volume
of migrant workers contributes something to the need for general
assistance. Particularly during the depression of the 1930's, when
migrants tended to be young or middle-aged able-bodied workers out
of a job, the strain on the general assistance program was enormous,
and brought about complete federal assumption of responsibility for
the needs of this group.29 How great is the burden of relief for non-
settled persons in more normal times is largely a matter of definition.
What surveys there are would seem to indicate that the real problem
of settlement during such periods lies in the complications of the
settlement laws rather than in a lack of physical residence on the part
of the relief applicants. A survey taken in the State of New York
in the late 1930's, at a time when that state still had a county settle-
ment law, illustrates this point.' °
The survey found that the nonsettled constituted approximately
eight per cent of the relief load in a typical county. Over half of this
number, however, did not have settlement because of what may be
called technical disabilities resulting from the complexities of the
settlement system. These will be developed at length throughout this
article. One example may be cited at this point, however. Under the
rules of derivative settlement a family takes the settlement of the
father if he has one. For this reason a wife and children, though liv-
ing in a county in which they have resided all their lives, might be
nonsettled in that county if the father and head of the family has his
settlement elsewhere.31
The problem of the transient needy may therefore be partly dis-
29. RYAN, op. cit. supra note 23, at 9. A survey in March 1933 found 201,596
transient persons needing assistance in 765 cities. Id. at 8. However, a congres-
sional investigation in 1941 found 4,000,000 migrants in need of assistance but
lacking settlement in the locality where they were residing. CIO COMMUNITY
SERvzcIs CoMuITTEE, NATIONAL NEws LETTER No. 4, GuIDE TO PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
(1950).
It appears that migration during the depression years of the 1930's generally
followed the pattern previously outlined. RYAN, op. cit. supra note 23, at 22-24;
Webb, supra note 21. However, there is some indication of aimless wan-
dering, and some persons ultimately returned to areas of poor opportunity and
high relief loads. See GOODRICH, MIGRATION AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY 503-19
(1986).
50. The survey is reported in Jackson, Settlement and Social Welfare in New
York State. 15 Soc. SEuv. REv. 432 (1941).
31. At the time of the survey, persons with state residence but without a
county settlement were given relief by the state. These individuals had an aver-
age residence in New York of 6.3 years, more than enough, on a cumulative
basis, for settlement in any county in the state. Id. at 434. The results of other
surveys confirm the New York findings. In Illinois, for example, during the
same period, it was found that only 4% of the relief cases had resided less than
three years in the community where they were found. House Select Committee,
Interstats Migration of Destitute Citizens, H.R. REP. No. 369, 77th Cong., 1st
Sees. 616 (1941).
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:counted, in view of the fact that many of the persons who are tech-
nically nonsettled may not be nonresidents in the real sense of the
word. However, the patterns of migration that have been outlined
do indicate that certain areas of the country might be expected to have
larger numbers of migrants than others. At the same time, it would
also seem that those areas which attract migrants are in a better posi-
tion to pay the increased welfare costs that result than the areas from
which the migrants come, since the former are generally more pro-
ductive and wealthier, relatively speaking. If the cost of relief for
migrants is charged back to the communities of origin, then those
areas suffer a double loss-the decline in productivity which results
from migration, and the continuing burden of supporting those indi-
viduals who are in need after they leave.
These assumptions are borne out by the New York study previously
mentioned.32 It covered reimbursement among the various counties
in the State of New York, and indicated that only five showed a large
favorable balance of receipts over payments. Perhaps the tendency of
migrant relief costs to balance in that state is due to the absence of a
large and definite population movement from one part of the state to
another. What is of greater interest is the fact that there was
a high degree of correlation between a large favorable balance and
population growth. In other words, the more desirable counties, eco-
•nomically speaking, which attracted the larger numbers of migrants,
were also those which benefited most from the settlement system.
While the poorer counties from which the migrants came suffered a
-double loss, the richer counties to which they migrated enjoyed a
double gain. Even so, it may be that the immediate impact of tran-
sient relief costs on some communities attracting large numbers of
migrants, or which play host to large numbers of migratory workers,
is more 'than the locality should be expected to bear.
One other factor which bears mentioning is the effect of settlement
laws on administrative costs. The cost of determining settlement as
a condition of eligibility, and of securing reimbursement from other
localities, is often so prohibitive that it exceeds the amount saved to
the locality in question.33 While excessive cost of administration might
32. Jackson, supra note 30, at 438. A similar survey in Iowa, in 1946, yielded
'similar results. Of the 99 counties in the state, 92 participated in the study. For
each county a comparison was made between the amount of money spent on non-
residents living in the county and the amount of money spent on residents living
outside the 'county. Of the participating counties, 54 spent more money on resi-
dents living elsewhere., Thirty of the counties had favorable or unfavorable
balandes of less than $100. Ross, LEGAL SETTLEMENT AND WARNING OUT IN IOWA
35 (unpubilished thesis in University of Nebraska Library 1951).
33. See, -e.g., CONNECTICUT EMERGENCY RELIEF COMMISSION, REPORT OF TlE
EMERGENCY RELIEF COMMISSION TO THE GOVERNOR 76 (1934); FALK, SETTLEMENT
•LAw.s#:,A. MA oR PROBLEM IN S6CIAL WELFARE 12..(1948); :kujP, INTERGOVERN-
MENTAL RELATIONS IN SOCIAL WELFARE 183 (1952) (experience in Minnesota)';
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not necessarily count against a statute, if it is a desirable one for
other reasons, it should be an important factor in the evaluation of
a requirement which justifies itself on the basis that it results in the
reduction of relief expenditures.
EVALUATION OF THE SETTLEMENT REQUIREMENT
An evaluation of the settlement requirement in the general assist-
ance law must take into consideration the nature of population move-
ments within the United States and the cumulative effects of migra-
tion patterns and settlement laws, both on the individuals involved
and on the general assistance program. Any such appraisal must also
ask whether the national need for unobstructed migration is superior
or subordinate to the choice to be made regarding a public policy for
relief. It appears to this writer that the importance to the national
economy of the fluidity and adaptability of the working force, in ac-
cordance with a well-considered migration policy, far outweighs the
benefits to b3 derived from the retention of settlement as part of the
general assistance program.U This comment deserves further ex-
planation.
This country has never had an explicit policy on migration, though
much that the federal government has done, as far back as the passage
of the Homestead Act of 1862, has had an important indirect effect
on population shifts.3 5 The need for a national stocktaking on migra-
tion policy, therefore, seems long overdue.3 Settlement laws are
necessarily a part of that policy, even though the large-scale migra-
tion of recent years would indicate that they have not had the adverse
effect on mobility which was claimed for them in an earlier day37 To
the extent, however, that the operation of the settlement statutes
creates hardships for migrants, these laws may be said to impose
undesirable impediments to population movement. Because of the
consequences of the present laws for national and individual well-
Ross. op. -;t. supra note 32, at 37; RYAN, AIGRATION AND SOCIAL WELFARE 52(1940). The New York study found that 18% of the over-all time of welfare
admiistrators was devoted to settlement questions. Jackson, supra note 30,
at 44 .
34. See PALMEn, EP, momu: SOCT IL VALUES IN LABOR MOBILITY AND ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITY I1l (Webbink ed. 1954).
35. For a discussion of these nroblems, see GOODRICH, MIORATTON AND ECo-
NOITI( OPT'1T'TTITITY 592 (1936). See also the comments in BAXKE. INTRODUCTION
IN LABnR MOBILITY AND Eco OMic OPPORTUNITY 1 (Webbink ed. 1954).
3 For suggestions lookinT to the solution of the problems posed by migratory
agricultural wnrkers, see CALIFORNIt GOvERNO"s CoImrmTmm TO SURVEY THE
ArnT,,1TJTT-"L LABon REq OURCES Or T1lE SN JOAQUIN VALLEY, AGRICULTURAL
Lmti , TN THE S&N JoKqUIN VALLEY 20, 146 (1951).
37. No pq's a figure thpn Admn Smith concluded that the English settlement
law seriously restricted the mobility of labor, though his conclusions in this
re,,vrd h-' been cbsllengei. Se- q'ITH. THEI WEALTH Or NATIONS 135-40
f Modern Library ed. 1937). Even Ms'thus felt comnelled to note the cruelty and
inhumanity of the settlement laws. MALTWJS, AN ESSAY ON-TIE PRINGIPtES OF
POPULATION 344 (Ward, Lock & Co. ed. 1890, reprinted from the 6th ed.' 1826)..
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being, an alteration in the existing settlement structure is required
which will eliminate the possibilities of hardship to nonresidents who
fall in need. At the same time, it does seem necessary to cushion the
extraordinary relief costs which must be faced by those communities
attracting large numbers of migrants.
Considerable attention was given to the problem of settlement
during the depression of the 1930's, and several proposals for change
or modification were made at that time. Perhaps the most frequent
proposal advocated the repeal of settlement laws,38 on the ground
that the cost of relief to migrants would tend to balance among the
communities affected. While this suggestion meets with the writer's
favor, provided some method were found to cushion the costs of
relief in those communities with extraordinary migrant relief bur-
dens, it does not appear politically possible at the present time.9
* If not repeal, at least modification of the present settlement statutes
seems desirable. It would seem, however, that this will become possible
only if the financial problems which arise in connection with giving
relief to migrants can be solved. Perhaps the most common suggestion
in this regard has been to shift the financial responsibility for mi-
grants by creating a new category for federal grants. The suggestion
is that the federal government bear one hundred per cent of the cost
38. See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU OF PUB. ASSISTANCE, FSA, REPORT No. 19, PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE GOALS (1952). The various proposals are discussed in FALK op. cit.
supra note 33, at 17; HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS BY THE 6OMMIT-
TEE'S SOCIAL SECURITY TECHNiCAL STAFF, Issues in Social Seclrity, 80th Cong.,
2d Sess. 308 (1948); RYAN, op. cit. supra note 33, at 83. Repeal may require
some method for preventing the receipt of aid from more than one state.
Another suggestion made in the 1930's was that the transient relief problem
be handled through interstate compacts. The difficulties inherent in this sugges-
tion are discussed in Falk, Social Action on Settlement Laws, 18 Soc. SEar. REv.
288 (1944). Extensive interstate negotiations, which such a proposal contem-
plates, would seem to be a practical impossibility. The experience with inter-
state transportation agreements,, which proved a failure, is indicative of the
problems involved.
39. There still seems to be considerable public opposition to repeal of the
settlement laws. For example, in a recent survey in Illinois, only 97 out of 578
persons replying favored the complete repeal of the settlement laws. As a con-
sequence, even though there was evidence that the enforcement of residence
requirements actually resulted in a greater expenditure of funds than would be
required if they were eliminated, the code revision commission did not provide for
their elimination. However, in accord with what appears to be a majority of the
replies received, the commission did recommend that aid to nonresidents be
handled on a more flexible basis. ILLINoIS PUBLIC ASSISTANCE LAWS COMMISSION,
A -PROPOSED PUBLIC ASSISTANCE CODE OF ILLINOIS 21, 122-23 (1947).
Further evidence of the stateof public opinion is found in the action of the
Rhode Island legislature, which abolished settlement in 1942 only to re-establish
it eight years later. See Leet, Rhode Island Abolishes Settlement, 18 SoC. SEav.
REv. 281 (1944); R.I. Public Laws 1950, c. 2413. Throughout the 1930's, there
was a trend toward stricter settlement laws. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND
MwANs BY THE COMMITTEE'S SOCIAL SECURITY TECHNICAL STAFF, op. cit. auprw
note 38, at 307-09. This trend may have been halted by those states which have
substituted state residence for-county or township settlement as a prerequisite
for relief.
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of aid to this group.40 This change would have the effect of federalizing
one of the social costs of migration, since the cost of relief to non-
residents would be borne by federal tax revenues toward which all
contribute. 41 Probably, federal help for the entire general assistance
program would again become a necessity if a national calamity on
the order of that experienced in the depression of the 1930's were to
occur again. Failing this, however, the selection of migrants as a new
class for categorical assistance strikes the writer merely as a continu-
ation of an unfortunate trend to separate deserving classes of persons
for treatment, without much consideration to the requirements of a
comprehensive program of social welfare.
Any attempt on the national level to alleviate the burden of migrant
relief will have to recognize that this is only one of the many problems
brought on by population growth due to substantial in-migration. It
should be noted that growing communities also face increased expen-
ditures for educational and other public services. Perhaps part of the
solution to the financial problem lies in a system of temporary federal
aid to localities which are forced to make rapid adjustments to take
care of population growth. Federal loans to help in the construction
of needed public service facilities, and federal interim grants to assist
in the transition to a period of higher welfare and other public costs,
may be of considerable help.'2 A similar program may be needed on
the state level to compensate for population shifts within the state.43
If financial help is made available to those areas which attract large
numbers of migrants, it may be possible to secure legislative changes
in the settlement laws which will simplify their administration and
mitigate their undesirable consequences for migrants who must apply
40. Sie, e.g., CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S COMMITTEE TO SURVEY THE AGRICULTURAL
LiBon Rc souRcEs OF THE SAN JOAQUIN VALLEY, op. cit. supra note 36, at 357,
403; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON MIGRATORY LABOR, MIGRATORY LABOR IN AMERI-
ciN AC.rICULTURE 125 (1951); National Conference of Social Work, Platform on
Interstate Migration, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFE'ENCE OF fOCIAL
WoRK 154 (1941); Haber & Cohen, Objectives for Public Welfare Legislation,
in READINGS IN SOCIAL SECURITY 528-29 (1948).
41. This solution may not be quite as equitable as it seems at first glance,
however, if it were found that the areas with the greatest number of migrants
were also the wealthier areas which contribute more, proportionately, to federal
revenues.
42. For a discussion of the budget and service problems currently facing many
municipalities, see KNEER, CITY GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 31-49, 675-
90 (1947). Areas attracting large numbers of migrants because of favorable
climatic conditions might also participate in the grant-in-aid program.
4:3. For a suggestion of this sort, see STATE DEP'T Or SOCIAL WELFARE PRE-
LIMINARY REPORT, SETTLEMENT AND SocIAL WELFARE IN NEW YORK STATE 21
(1941). State grants to cushion excessive relief expenditures are authorized in
many states. A strong case for such aid may be made out in states which re-
quire only a state residence for general assistance. Such a statute substantially
modifies the settlement system since it eliminates local settlement as a method
for allocating the cost of relief to in-state transients.
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for assistance." What changes seem to be required can be indicated
briefly at this point. First of all, it does not seem proper to punish
anybody who is in need on the ground that he has settlement else-
where. The locality applied to should be directed to give assistance
first and seek reimbursement later. A reasonable residence period
should be fixed, and a hotbed adopted for determining settlement in
an objective manner. Some simple procedure should also be made
available for making adjustments between communities. Lastly, it
will be indicated that the- settlement laws impinge on family relation-
ships. Whenever this occurs, the prime necessity of keeping the family
together as a functioning unit must be emphasized. The remainder
of this article will examine the law of settlement to determine to what
extent these general objectives have been met, and to detail, when
necessary, ways in which they might better be achieved.
ACQUISITION OF ORIGINAL SETTLEMENT: RESIDENCE OR DOMICI=E
The point should be made at the outset that settlement law affects
everybody, since a settlement may be acquired whether a person is
in need or not.45 This is a fact which should be kept in mind during
the course of this discussion. Under the American settlement statutes,
unless an individual has acquired a settlement from his parents or by
birth, settlement can usually be acquired only by a period of con-
tinuous residence in the locality from which assistance is sought." The
old alternatives to the acquisition of settlement by residence, such as
44. A uniform settlement law was proposed by the National Conference of
Social Work in 1899, but was adopted only in Kansas and Minnesota and has
since been altered in those states. FALK, SsTTIMIENT LAWS: A MAJOR PRoLsi iN
SocIu. WELARE 17 (1948). While the chance of securing widespread adoption
of a uniform law seems remote, nevertheless, such a law. might provide he pful
guidance to legislatures contemplating changes in the settlement statutes. Indeed,
a uniform law for all phases of general assistance might well be desirable.
45. County of Redwood v. Minneapolis, 126 Minn. 512, 148 N.W. 469 (1914).
46. ALA. CODE tit. 44, § 5 (1940) (6 months); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 2575, 2576(1949) (4 years); IOWA CODE ANN. c. 252, § 252.16(1) (1949) (2 years); ME.
Rsv. STAT. c. 94, § I (VI) (1954) (5 years); MASS. ANN. LAwS c. 116, § 1 (1949)(5 years); Miss. CODE ANN. § 7354 (1942) (6 months); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 205.-
600 (Vernon 1952) (local program, 1 year); N H. REv. LAWS c. 123. § 1 (IX)(1942) (5 years); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153-159(1) (1952) (1 year); Onio REV.
CODE § 5113.05 (Baldwin Supp. 1955) (1 year in county, 3 months in municipal-
ity) ; OxA. STAT. ANN. tit. 56, § 40 (1950) (local program, 6 months); S.C. CODE§ 71-152(4) (1952) (3 years); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4808 (Williams 1934) (1
year); VT. REv. STAT. § 7097 (1947) (3 years); Wis. STAT. § 49.10(4) (1953)
(1 year); Wyo. CoMP. STAT. ANN. § 25-132 (Supp. 1953) (in effect, 1 year in
county).
The Nebraska statute provides that settlement can be gained by one year's
residence in a county, except that persons who have resided one year in the
state but not in any one county have settlement in a county in which they have
resided for six months. NEB. Rnv. STAT. § 68-115(1) (Supp. 1953). The North
Dakota provision is similar, except that in the latter event settlement is Pfained
in the county in 1%rich the individual. has "longest resided." N.D. Rnv. COD
50-0204 (Supp. 1953).
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property ownership, payment of taxes, election to office, and the like,
are gone.47
While the length of residence required varies from less than one
year to six, a one-year period or less seems average for most of the
counthy.1 Some states have progressed to the point that they require
only a state residence to receive general assistance from any particular
city or county, greatly simplifying administrative problems and miti-
gating the effects of the law, at least for those who live within the
state.4" Other statutes, however, require a local residence in addition
.47. The Connecticut statute still provides that a settlement in a town may be
gained by a person coming from another state by "EA]t least one year of con-
tinuous residence in such town, [being] possessed in his own right in fee of
unincumberel real estate, situated in this state, of the value of five hundred
dollars." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 2575 (1949). For typical cases interpreting this
provision, see Town of Clinton v. Town of Westbrook, 38 Conn. 9 (1871) (cloud on
the title other than an encumbrance does not defeat settlement); Inhabitants of
Weston v. Inhabitants of Reading, 5 Conn. 255 (1824) (statute contemplates
actual possession in own right and not under the authority of another). Under
the earlv version of the statute, the amount of an encumbrance was not computed
in asce taining value. Town of Barkhamsted v. Town of Farmington, 2 Conn.
600 (1818). See also Town of Kirby v. Town of Waterford, 15 Vt. 753 (1843)(under prior Vermont statute). Property ownership requirements were common
in early settlement laws.
At least one state, in addition, has retained a provision which awards an
aprretnice the srttlement of the person to whom he is apprenticed. OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 56, § 40 (1950).
48. See the tabulation of settlement laws in general assistance programs in
MINNESOTA I EGISLATIvE RsEARCH CoMM.xITTEE, PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PoIcms
A ONG THE STATES table 38 (1951). The courts have taken notice of the liberal
influence on settlement laws resulting from the need to attract migrants. See
East Windsor v. Montgomery. 9 N.JL. 39 (Sup. Ct. 1827); Wayne Township v.
Stock Township, 3 Ohio 171 (1827).
49. Alas-a Sess. Laws 1953, c. 110, § I(b) (1 year in territory); AmIZ. CoDE
ANN. § 70-902(2) (Supp. 1952) (state pro-ram, 5 of 9 years, and 1 year pre-
cedinr application); KAN. GEN. STAT. § 39-709(F)(2) (Supp. 1953) (same);
LA. P'i'. STAT § 46:109 (1950) (same); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 88A,§ 17 (1951) (2 years for able-bodied persons); MONT. Rm. CODES ANN. § 71-302(1947) (in effect, I year in state); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-2-1 (1953) (local pro-
gram, I ye-r); NY. SOCIAL WEL-AtRE LAW §§ 62, 117 (1 year); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. G. k 21.6(A) (Supp. 1954) (state pro-,ram, 1 year); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 62, 2509 (Supp. 1954) (1 year unless reciprocal agreement with state of
1 .st rod;cone); R1. Public Laws 1950, c 2413, § 1 (1 year): UTAH CO-E ANN. §
55-2-29 (Supp. 1955) (state program, I year); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 626(90)
(1955) (1 year).
In New York, local residence h-s been retained to some extent, as the statute
places the financial responsibility for the cost of medical and institutional care
for state residents on the community in which the recipient has spent a con-
tiruovq six-mninth period in the twot years prior to the granting of such relief.
N.Y. SOCnIT. WELFARE LAW . 62(2). The settlement provisiens in KAN. GEN.
STAT. n9-102 to -104 (1949). have been construed to app'v only to nersons
seekinr ad"- ission to state inqtitutions County of Barton v. County of Stafford,
133 V-ln. 494, I P.2d 80 (1931). Detailed settlement provisions are contained in
the Pensylvania statutes anthor'ir "-  inqfitutional care by local institution dis-
tricts. P,. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, 2331 (1941). These district; -- e also charged
with rroviding aid to incapacitated persons who are not eligible for general
asF'qtannc.
Several of the state laws authorizing hospitalizption and other forms of
rne3 lial asist-nce contain a resilenc- requirement different from that contained
in the general assistance law. For the most part, residence in the state is all
that is required. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-1137 (Burns 1951) (1 year);
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to the state residence, which may complicate administration due to the
need for acquiring two settlements.0 In these states, furthermore, the
period of state residence may often be longer than the period of local
residence under statutes which require only the latter.
Whatever the period of residence required, and whether on a state
or local level or both, whether an acquired settlement under the gen-
eral relief statutes is to be considered simply as a residence or as a
domicile of choice is the fundamental problem of statutory interpreta-
tion. The answer is an important one for the person seeking public
assistance since, if settlement is the equivalent of domicile, its ac-
quisition will require, not only a period of residence, but the intent
to make the place of residence a home.51 Furthermore, such an ap-
proach might make applicable to settlements the rule that everyone
must have a domicile.52 If this were so, everybody in need would be
entitled to help somewhere.
IOWA CODE ANN. c. 255, § 255.1 (1949) (legal Iowa resident residing in the county)
TENN. CODE ANN. § 4830.3(h) (Williams Supp. 1954) (resident of the state);
VA. CODE § 32-294 (Supp. 1954) (person domiciled in county or city with 12
months" state residence). But of. S.D. Sess. Laws 1953, c. 131, § 3 (poor relief
settlement determines county liability for hospitalization). For a discussion of
the difficulties that have arisen from the reluctance of Iowa counties to commit
persons to the University Hospital who do not have settlement in the county,
even though the statute authorizes them to do so, see Ross, LEGAL SETTLEMENT
AND WARNING OUT IN IOWA 44-46 (unpublished thesis in University of Nebraska
Library 1951). Delays in treatment are said to result from prolonged negotiations
between the county of settlement and the county of actual residence to determine
which should pay the cost of care.
50. CAL. WELFARE & INST. CODE § 2555 (Supp. 1955), § 2556 (1952) (3 years
in state, county of longest residence); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 31-3404 (1948) (1
year in state, 6 months in county); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 23, §§ 436-10, 439-6 (Supp.
1954) (1 year in state, 6 months in locality) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-147(d) (Burns
1951) (3 years in state, 1 year in township); NEv. Comp. LAws § 5143 (Supp.
1941) (3 years in state, 6 months in county); N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 44:8A-3, 44:8A-4
(Supp. 1954) (2 years in state, 1 year in municipality); ORE. REV. STAT. 4 411.
720(1) (1953) (3 years in state, 1 year in county); SD. CODE § 50.0102(4)
(1939) (1 year in state, 90 days in county); TEx. STAT., REV. Civ. art. 2351(11)
(1950) (1 year in state, 6 months in county); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-5-60(1)(1953) (local program, 1 year in state, 4 months in'county).
The settlement picture in Michigan is quite confused, as the legislature has en-
acted a state-suvervised program of general assistance without expressly repealing
the statutes authorizing a local, unsupervised program of general relief The state-
supervised program requires a one-year residence in the state. MICH. STAT. ANN.§ 16.455(a-1) (Supp. 1953). The local program requires a one-year residence
in the municipality administering the program. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 16.169
(1950). The Michigan Department of Social Welfare presently relies on an
opinion by the state Attorney General, who read the two provisions together and
found that bofh a state and a local residence is required for general asgistance.
Letter from W.J. Maxey, Director, Michigan Department of Sncial Welfare, to
the author, August 30, 1954. However, the Michigan Supreme Court, in Antrim
County Board v. Lapeer County Board, 332 Mich. 224, 50 N.W.2d 769 (1952),
ignored the settlement provision in the statute authorizing the state-supervised
program and appeared to indicate that the question of settlement is simply one of
local settlement under the older statute. It seems that the more recent provision
was not cited in either of the briefs in this case. No locality has attempted to rely
oh this decision. Letter from W.J. Maxey, sunra.
51. 1 BEALE, CoNFruCT OF LAws § 10.3 (1935).
52.-Id. § 11.1.
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Some of the general assistance laws explicitly indicate that. settle-
ment is the equivalent of domicile to the extent that the acquisition
of a settlement is made dependent both on residence and the intent to
make the locality a home, 3 Most of the statutes, however, simply
provide that settlement is acquired by "residing" in the prescribed
area for the required length of time. Even under the latter type of
statute, however, most courts have adopted the position that settle,-
ment requires the union of intent and residence.5' However,. some
courts have followed what appears to be the more logical meaning of
the law, and have held that residence alone is sufficent.5 5 The reasou
5". CAL. WELFARE & INST. CODE § 2555 (1952) (state settlement); MIOiH. STAT.
ANN. § 16.455(a-1) (Supp. 1953) (state residence); N.H. REv. LAWS c. 123, .§
1 (IX) (1942) ("domicile" for 5 years required); N.J. REV. STAT. § 44:8A-3(Supp. 1954) (residence and domicile required for state settlement);" VT.
R v $ S rA. § 7097 (1947). For a case applying the Vermont statute, see City of
Montpclier v. Town of Calais, 114 Vt. 5, 39 A.2d 350 (1944).
-h e are a few statutes which use language that appears to leave in doubt the
question whether an intent is required. Alaska Sess. Laws 1953, c.. 110, §
1 (b) ("lived in the Territory"); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 23, §§ 436-10, 439-6 (Supp.
1954) ("permanent home"); ME. REV. STAT. c. 94, § I(VI) (1954) ("having his
home in a town"); S.C. CODE § 71-152(4) (1952) ("lived in a county"); of. North
Yarmouth v. West Gardiner, 58 Me. 207 (1870) ("home" in the Maine statutes
is the equivalent of residence).
54, Town of Washington v. Town of Warren, 123 Conn. 268, 193 At. 751(1937); Town of Salem v. Town of Lyme, 29 Conn. 74 (1860); Town of Dorr
v. Town of Seneca, 74 Ill. 101 (1874); Audubon County v. Vogessor, 228 "Iowa
281, 291 N.W, 135 (1940); Cass County v. Audubon County, 221 Iowa 1037, 266
N.W. 293 (1936); County of Cerio Gordo v. County of Hancock. 53 Iowa 114, 12
N.W. 124 (1882); Inhabitants of Gouldsboro v. Inhabitants of Sullivan, 132 Ale.
342, 170 At. 900 (1934); Inhabitants of Knox v. Inhabitants of Montville, 98 Me.
493, 57 Atl. 792 (1904); Inhabitants of Warren v. Inhabitants of Thomaston, 43
Me. 406 (1857) (semble); Inhabitants of Wayne v. Inhabitants of Greene, 21 Mle.
357 (1842); Inhabitants of Whately v. Inhabitants of Hatfield, 196 Mass. 393,
82 N.E. 43 (1907); Phillips v. Boston, 183 Mass. 314, 67 N.E. 250 (1903);
Inhabitants of Palmer v. Inhabitants of Hampden, 182 Mass. 511, 65 N.E.
817 (1903); In re Town of Hector, 24 N.Y. Supp. 475 (County Ct. 1893);
County of Burke v. County of Buncombe, 101 N.C. 520, 8 S.E. 176 (1888)(seiz Oc); Marion Township v. Howard Borough, 12 Pa. D. & C. 292 (Q.S. 1929);
Appeal of Lawrence County, 71 SD. 49, 21 N.W.2d 57 (1945) ; Waushara County
v. Calumet County. 238 Wis. 230, 298 N W. 613 (1941). But of. County of Cerro
Gordo v. County of Wright, 50 Iowa 439 (1879). BEALE, op. cit. supra note 51,
§§ 15.1-25 1, develops in detail the many rules relating to intent as an essential
element in the law of domicile.
The importance of establishing a physical residence, together with the neces-
sary intent, may be illustrated by the case in which the father sends his family
to a new home in a new locality but delays his own move. This may be .by
personal choice or for reasons beyond his control. Whether the husband's domicile
shifts on the day his family moves has led to conflicting results. Id. § 16.4. For
conflicting decisions under the settlement laws compare Inhabitants of Hardwick
v. Inhabitants of Raynham, 14 Mass. 363 (1817) (settlement be,ins upon occupa-
tion by family), with Inhabitants of Fayette v. Inhabitants of Livermore, 62 Me,
229 (1873); Town of Washington v. Town of Warren, 123 Conn. 268, 193 AtI.
751 (1937). Settling in a community would seem to make a man a member of it
even though his actual arrival is delayed. This is particularly true if the delay
is involuntary.
511 Town of Smiley v. Villafre of St. Hilaire, 183 Minn. 533, 237 N.W. 416(1931); In re Wilson, 58 N.W.2d 470 (N D. 1953); City of Enderlin v. Pontiac
Township, 62 N.D. 105, 242 N.W. 117 (1932) ; State v. Esbaugh, 2 Ohio Op. 345, 5
Ohio Sunp. 316 (C.P. 1935). But cf. Town of Albion v. Village of Manle Lake, 71
Minn. 1 0, 74 N.W. 282 (1898); Burke County v. Oakland, 56 N.D. 343, 217 N.W.
643 (1927); Henrietta Township v. Oxford Township, 2 Ohio St. *32 (1853). The
cases last cited appear to have adopted the intent rule, but are earlier in time and
may no longer be authoritative.Washington University Open Scholarship
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for the adoption of the intent requirement does not seem clear, unless
it be by the accident of analogy to the most conveniently applicable
doctrine.' 6Even those courts, however, which require intent, cannot be said
to have fully adopted the rule that settlement is the equivalent of
domicile, since the acquisition of settlement requires a prescribed
period of residence, while a domicile may be acquired without refer-
ence to any particular length of time. This appears to be the meaning
of those cases which reject the notion that settlement is the equivalent
of domicile, but cling to the intent rule.5 7 What the courts have done
in those states, is to import into the settlement requirement only one
of the attributes of a domicile. Some courts have also adopted the
rule that the settlement statutes, apart from requiring an intent to
make the locality in question a home, also require a residence that is
permanent and not transitory. 8
It is difficult to see why concepts of intent and permanency should
be introduced into the settlement laws. Even if settlement were based
solely on physical residence, this would seem to be sufficient to avoid
the supposed dangers which will result from opening the local treasury
to strangers. As applied to a particular applicant seeking aid in a
particular locality,59 the intent or permanency rule may result in the
'56. Thus, Beale states that the reason for equating settlement with domicile
lies in the necessity of assigning every person who may become a public charge
a community from which he might receive aid. Beale, Residence and Domicil, 4
IOWA L. BuLL. 3, 6 (1918). However, a court could adopt this rule without neces-
sarily adopting the rule that the acquisition of a settlement requires the union
of residence and intent. See also The Queen v. Inhabitants of Stapleton, 1 El. &
Bl. 766, 118 Eng. Rep. 623 (Q.B. 1853). Lord Campbell refused to accept the
suggestion of counsel that settlement under the English poor law was the equiva-
lent of domicile, though this construction was urged by way of analogy.1 57. See, e.g., Town of Washington v. Town of Warren, 123 Conn. 268, 193 Atl.
751 (1937) ; Town of Chaplin v. Town of Bloomfield 92 Conn. 395, 103 Atl. 118(1918); Town of Reading v. Town of Westport, 19 Conn. 561 (1849).
58. County of Cerro Gordo v. County of Wright, 50 Iowa 439 (1879); Inhabi-
tants of Warren v. Inhabitants of Thomaston, 43 le. 406 (1857); Appeal of
Lawrence County, 71 S.D. 49, 21 N.W.2d 57 (1945). See also the Connecticut
cases cited in note 63 infra. However, it has been stated that settlement may be
acquired without having a residence or home in the locality. See Inhabitants of
Warren. v. Inhabitants of Thomaston, supra; BEALS, op. cit. supra note 51,§ 16.3; ef. Inhabitants of Wilton v. Inhabitants of Falmouth, 15 Me. 479 (1839)(person living as tenant at will of relative may get settlement). The rule should
not be taken too literally, however, as the discussion of cases involving migrants
will show.
59. See the interesting discussion in In re Seidel, 204 Minn. 357, 283 N.W.
742 (1939), holding.that intent is necessary to the establishment of settlement
under the old age assistance program, but not under the general assistance law.
The court noted:
The poor relief law .... is essentially an emergency measure, and in many
cases the recipients of relief are dependent on such assistance for life itself.
Under such circumstances, the domiciliary intent of an applicant is of negli-
gible significance. The purpose of the old age assistance act is of a different
nature. Such assistance is, in one sense, a reward bestowed by the commu-
nity on its aged members for past services and good citizenship. Extreme
pove'fv iq not a nrereouisite to assistance.
td. at 361, 283 N.W. at 744.
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denial of a settlement because of the individual's character or living
habits. This is particularly true in the case of itinerants, who move
from place to place and who have no fixed abode. Agricultural laborers
are a case in point. While most courts do not seem to have discrim-
inated against itinerant workers in the application of the settlement
laws,o in other cases these rules have been manipulated to prevent
such individuals from gaining a settlement.
Typical of these is a New York case, In re Town of Hector,61 decided
at a time when New York still had a local settlement law. This case
involved two immigrant Italian workingmen, who had lived within
the town in question for the required statutory period, one year, but
who had moved from place to place as part of a railroad workgang.
Because the railroad work was temporary, and because one of the men
had expressed a tentative desire to return to Italy, the court found
that they had not acquired a settlement on the ground that they had
no definite intent to remain in the town. The Connecticut court, in
Town of Madison v. Town of Guilford, 2 reached the same result in
the case of a subintelligent handyman, who shifted about from place
to place but who had resided within the same town for the four-year
statutory period. It found that the residence required by the statute
must be permanent, but that this man's residence had only been
temporary.63
It is not suggested that the results reached in the Connecticut and
New York cases are necessarily typical, nor, since they are not par-
ticularly recent, that they still constitute "good law" even in those
jurisdictions. These cases are cited simply to show how the rules
grafted on the language of the statutes may be manipulated by a hos-
60. The following cases are typical of those in which the court awarded a
settlement to migratory workers under the same principles applied to other per-
sons: Town of Dorr v. Town of Seneca, 74 Ill. 101 (1874); County of Cerro Gordo
v. County of Hancock, 58 Iowa 114, 12 N.W. 124 (1882) ; Inhabitants of Greene v.
Inhabitants of Windham, 13 Me. 225 (1836); Inhabitants of Abington v. Inhabi-
tants of Boston, 4 Mass. *312 (1808) (sailor). These cases all involved itinerant
workers who were found to have a settlement in a locality which they regarded as
their home, though they left it periodically. See the discussion of the continuity
factor in settlement in the text supported by note 65 infra.
61. 24 N.Y. Supp. 475 (County Ct. 1893) (under prior law). While itinerant
immigrant workingmen are a matter for history, similar problems are posed today
by migratory agricultural and other workers, many of whom are aliens. For a
similar case, see Noyes Township v. Chapman Township, 21 Pa. Dist. 667 (Q.S.
1912) (under prior law).
62. 85 Conn. 55, 81 Atl. 1046 (1911). The court denied that it was deciding
that a transient of this sort could not acquire a settlement, but the import of the
decision is quite to the contrary. The court obliquely referred to the individual
in question as a vagrant. Since the Connecticut court had adopted the intent
rule with regard to settlements, it could have reached the same result as the
New York court through the application of this requirement.
63. For other Connecticut cases adopting the permanency rule, see Town of
Washington v. Town of Warren. 123 Conn. 268, 193 Atl. 751 (1937); Town of
Ridgefield v. Town of Fairfield, 73 Conn. 47, 46 At. 245 (1900); Town of Salem
v. Town of Lyme, 29 Conn. 74 (1860).
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tile court to deprive the members of a disfavored group-of the chance
of acquiring a settlement. Since persons in need of relief are most
likely to come from the migrant groups, the results of these cases are
especially to be deplored. 64
Another situation that has created difficulties for the courts is the
.temporary absence. In fact, the manner in which this problem hag
been handled would indicate that the differences between those courts
which do and those which do not adopt the intent requirement are
more apparent than real.
The problem arises because almost everybody who settles in a com-
munite does not stay there indefinitely without leaving. If anything,
he will leave it from time to time on business trips, or for vacations,
or to visit relatives. The question then arises whether the individual's
absence interrupts the acquisition of a settlement. While it would
hardly seem that the settlement period has been interrupted in the
cases just stated, it should be pointed out that recognizing an excep-
tion in cases like this is a tacit admission of the fact that an actual
physical presence in the community throughout the statutory period
is not required by the statute. Calling the residence "constructive"
during the individual's absence does not hide or alter this basic fact.
Once it is admitted, however, that a settlement may continue though
it is physically interrupted, some way must be found to rationalize
that fact consistent with the settlement doctrine. This seems compelled
by the statutes, which usually provide that the residence must be "con-
64. There are a few statutes which contain the additional requirement thdt
the residence sufficient to acquire a settlement must be "bona fide." ALA. CODE
tit. 44, § 5 (1940); MISS. CODE ANN. § 7354 (1942); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66,§ 26.6(A) (Supp. 1954) (state program); TEx. STAT., REV. CIV. art. 2351(11)(1950). A similar provision once appeared in the Pennsylvania statute, and still
appears in the Pennsylvania settlement law governing institution districts. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2331(d) (1941). It does not appear to have had any notice-
able effect on the Pennsylvania decisions. Cf. Noyes Township v. Chapman
Township, 21 Pa. Dist. 667 (Q.S. 1912).
Because of the early statutory requirement that a settlement could not be
obtained if an individual were "warned out," some courts held that a settlement
could not be gained unless it were "open and notorious." Inhabitants of
Newbury v. Inhabitants of Harvard, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) *1 (1827) (also an ef-
lightening social document); Town of Newbury v. Town of Topsham; 7 Vt. *407
(1835). Contra, Henrietta Township v. Oxford Township, 2 Ohio St. *32 (1853).
With the general repeal of warning out provisions, this rule must be taken to
be obsolete.
Some statutes contain special provisions relating to the settlement of persons
inducted or enlisting in the armed services. See, e.g., MASS ANN. LAWS c. 116. §
1 (Surn. 1954). awarding a settlement in the place where the individual "actually
resided" prior to entry. This provision has been interpreted, however, to mean
that settlement is in the place in which the individual was living with some
degree of,"e pected permanence," and not, for example, in the locality in which
he temrorarily resided just prior to induction. City of Cambridge v. City of
-Somerville, 329 Mass. 658, 110 N.E.2d 99 (1953); City of Marlborough v. City of
Lynn, 275 Mass. 394, 176 N.E. 214 (1931). For a general discussion of residence
requirements, with references to the general assistance laws, see Reese & Green,
That Elusive Word, "Residence," 6 VAND. L. REv. 561 (1953).
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tinuous."6 5 While the examples given above seem easy to handle, the
problem of devising a satisfactory rule is much complicated 'if the
absence is for the purpose of seeking work, the individual leaving-to
take work temporarily in another community, but eventually return-
ing to the community from which he departed.
There are a few statutes which authorize a "temporary" or "casual"
absence for labor or other special purposes," but do not indicate what
is a temporary or casual absence. None of them seem to have been
interpreted by the courts. However, even in the absence of an explicit
statutory provision, the courts seem to have engrafted a similar ex-
ception to the settlement laws, and have stated that a temporary ab-
sence will not interrupt the acquisition of a settlement.6 7
However, the tests for determining when an absence is temporary
are far from clearAr- Most of the cases considering the question have
arisen in states which have adopted the rule that settlement requires
residence plus intent, but this does not seem to be a significant factor.
Some courts have held that an absence from the locality will interrupt
the acquisition of a settlement unless, when the individual left, there
was an intention to return.69 Some decisions, however, make no at-
65. Some of the statutes accomplish the same result by providing that the
restdence must be in a period "immediately preceding" the application. See the
statutes cited in note 49 supra. A few of these statutes provide that the applicant
must have resided in the state 5 years out of the last 9, but add that he must
have lived in the state only in the year preceding the application. This mitigates
the effect of the continuity requirement. This type of statute is characteristic in
the categorical programs. See BROWN, PUBLIC RELIEF 1929-1939, at 373-75 (1940).
036. CAL, WELFARE & INST. CODE ANN. § 2552 (1952); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 16.
455 (a-1) (Supp. 1953) (may only apply to loss of residence once acquired) ; ORE.
REV. STAT. § 411.720(2) (1953). Some statutes provide that absence in the armed
services, or in the service of the state or federal government, does not interrupt
the acquisition of a settlement. See, e.g., WYO. CoMxP. STAT. ANN. § 25-132 (Supp.
1953).
#;7. See People ex rel. Heydenreich v. Lyons, 374 Ill. 557, 566, 30 N E.2d 46, 51
(1940) (dictum); Inhabitants of Stoughton v. City of Cambridge, 165 Mass. 251,
253, 43 N.E. 106 (1896) (dictum); Inhabitants of Greenfield v. Inhabitants of
Buckland, 159 Mass. 491, 34 N.E 952 (1893) (opinion by Justice Holmes); In re
Boise, 73 N.D. 16, 11 N.W.2d 80 (1943) (state residence) (semble).
68. For an English case adopting the rule permitting settlement despite tem-
porary absence, but admitting that it is necessarily vague, see Overseers of
Wellington v. Overseers of Whitchurch, 4 B. & S. 99, 122 Eng. Rep. 397 (K.B.
1863).
69. Town of Winchester v. Town of Burlington, 128 Conn. 185, 21 A.2d 371
(1941); Town of Clinton v. Town of Westbrook, 38 Conn. 9 (1871); Town of
Salem v. Town of Lyme, 29 Conn. 74 (1860); Town of Gouldsboro v. Town of
Sullivan, 132 Me. 342, 170 AtI. 900 (1934); Inhabitants of Ellsworth v. Inhabi-
tants of Bar Harbor, 122 Me. 356, 120 AtI. 50 (1923); North Yarmouth v. West
Gardiner, 58 Me. 207 (1870); Inhabitants of Eatontown v. Inhabitants of Shrews-
bury, 49 N.J.L. 188, 6 Atl. 319 (Sup. Ct. 1886), aff'd per curiam, 49 N.J.L. 482,
9 Atl. 718 (Ct. Err. & App. 1887); Henrietta Township v. Brownhelm Township,
9 Ohio *76 (1839); Westmoreland County Poor District's Appeal, 77 Pa. Super.
402 (1921) ; City of Montpelier v. Town of Calais, 114 Vt. 5, 39 A.2d 350 (1944) ;
Town of Peacham v. Town of Kirby, 109 Vt. 288, 196 AtI. 243 (1937); Town of
Mount Holly v. Town of Plymouth, 89 Vt. 301, 95 Atl. 572 (1915) ; Town of Barton
v. Town of Irasburgh, 33 Vt. 159 (1860) (settlement denied to itinerant worker);
Town of Middletown v. Town of Poultney, 2 Vt. *437 (1830). The Vermont cases
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tempt to isolate the fact of a temporary absence, and treat this along
with other facts as evidence to be considered in determining whether
the individual has an affirmative intent to stay in the locality.O Other
cases, without referring to the intent to return requirement, hold that
a settlement has not been acquired because the absence indicates that
the residence was not permanent."' Throughout all of these decisions
there is a disposition on the part of the courts to deny settlement to
itinerants who move from place to place, either under one of the rules
just stated, or because of a frank admission that such individuals are
not capable of acquiring a settlement.7 2
The cases which have considered these problems leave much to be
desired. For one thing, merely pointing to the fact of absence and
calling this an indication that the residence of the individual was not
permanent is hardly a sufficient explanation of the result of a case,
since the court has not indicated why the residence is not permanent.
Presumably, since the individual's own declarations cannot be relied
upon exclusively, some method must be found to evaluate both his
statements and the other facts of the case. If a jurisdiction has
require, in addition, that the individual have a place in the locality to which he
has the right to return. This requirement does not seem general. Cf. Inhabitants
of South Thomaston v. Inhabitants of Friendship, 95 Me. 201, 49 At]. 1056 (1901).
70. Town of Roxbury v. Town of Bridgewater, 85 Conn. 196, 82 Atl. 193 (1912)
(settlement denied to itinerant worker); Town of Dorr v. Town of Seneca, 74 Ill.
101 (1874) (settlement awarded to itinerant); County of Cerro Gordo v County
of Hancock, 58 Iowa 114, 12 N.W. 124 (1882) (same); Inhabitants of Wilbraham
v. Inhabitants of Ludlow, 99 Mass. 587 (1868) (settlement denied to itinerant
worker).
The reasoning of these cases is not always clear, but they seem to treat the
question of absence as part of the problem of proving an affirmative intent to
stay in the locality claimed as a settlement. By comparing these cases with those
cited in the previous and following footnotes, it will be noted that there is some-
times more than one approach to this problem in the same jurisdiction. For
example, some of the Massachusetts cases indicate that continuity can be inter-
rupted only by an affirmative intent to take up a new residence elsewhere rather
than a negative intent to abandon an old one. See Inhabitants of Lee v. Inhabi-
tants of Lenox, 81 Mlass. 496 (1860); City of Worcester v. Inhabitants of Wil-
braham, 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 586 (1859).
71. The emphasis on the residence factor seems to appear primarily in the
Connecticut cases. See Town of Winchester v. Town of Burlington, 128 Conn. 185,
21 A.2d 371 (1941); Town of Fairfield v. Town of Easton, 73 Conn. 735, 49 Atl.
200 (1901). The confusion which sometimes results in an attempt to apply
conflicting doctrine is illustrated by the case of Town of Washington v. Town of
Warren, 123 Conn. 268, 193 Atl. 751 (1937) (denying settlement to an itinerant
worker), where the court comments:
The intent is the controlling factor in determining the question of domicil.
. . The trial court has not found an intention on her part to establish a
domicil in the town of Washington. Strictly speaking the question is not one
of domicil but of continuous residence within the terms of the statute. And
by this is meant actual and not merely constructive residence.
Id. at 272-73, 193 Atl. at 753.
72. For cases which appear to base their results on the inability of an itinerant
worker to secure a settlement, see Inhabitants of Jefferson v. Inhabitants of
Washington, 19 Me. 293 (1841) (judgment of lower court reversed on the facts);
Inr e Wilson, 58 N.W.2d 470 (N.D. 1953). It will be noted that the application of
any of the rules stated in the text can result in the denial of settlement to per-
sons in this group. But see the cases cited in note 60 supra.
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adopted the intent requirement as a component of settlement, it is -at
least consistent to subsume the fact of a temporary absence under this
general concept, or to isolate it as a separate fact and require an intent
to return on the part of the person who has departed. In a jurisdiction
which only requires residence to gain settlement, however, it would
seem that the problem of a temporary absence would have to be dealt
with separately. Since the individual is not in fact in the community
during the period of absence, some formula will have to be devised
which will enable the absence to be overlooked in the proper case.
Probably the best method to deal with this problem would be to pro-
vide, by statute, that absences for admittedly temporary purposes,
e.g., for a vacation trip, do not interrupt the acquisition of a settle-
ment. An individual might also be permitted an absence for any pur-
pose for a reasonable length of time, perhaps one year, on the basis
that an absence beyond this period is a sufficient indication that he
has severed his tie with the community. This type of statute would
avoid the difficulties involved in attempting to assess a state of mind,
yet would provide a fair measure to determine who is and who is not.
temporarily absent from the locality.
There are statutes in a few jurisdictions which bear examination
because they appear to avoid some of these difficulties, yet retain the
residence requirement. Under these statutes, the locality responsible
for the care of an applicant is that in which he has longest resided
within a given period, usually one or two years, or the county or
municipality in which the individual actually resided at a particular
time prior to his application.7 3 The Minnesota system, although it is
unnecessarily complicated, is typical of statutes of the former type.74
73. In California a person who does not have a permanent settlement within a
county is to be helped by that county "[Wlherein he was present for the longest
time during the three-year period" immediately preceding his application. CAL.
WELFARE & INST. CODE § 2556 (1952). Colorado in effect provides that a settle-
ment is awarded in the county in which the applicant actually resided or worked
six months prior to his application. COLO. Rnv. STAT. ANN. c. 36, art. 10, §§ 10,
15 (1953). See note 74 infra for a discussion of MINN. STAT. ANN. § 261.07(1)
(West Supr. 1954). In North Dakota, a person may get a settlement through one
year's residence in a county, but a person who has resided one year continuously
in the state, but not in any county, "[S]hall have a residence in the county in
which he or she has lonzest reqided within such year." N.D. REV. CODE § 50-0204
(1) (2) (Supp. 1953). Cf. N.H. Sess. Laws 1953, c. 119 (liability of one county
to another for care of county charges is placed on county where individual last
resided or was lqst assisted). For a case applying the North Dakota law, sed
In re Boise, 73 N.D. 16, 11 N.W.2d 80 (1943).
74. Under the Minnesota statutes a county may adopt either the county or town
system of relief. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 261.06 (West 1947). Under the county plan
the county is liable for all relief costs, while under the town plan the townships
and all the municipalities in the county bear the cost of general assistance. A
recent survey reported that only 22 of the 87 Minnesota counties were not on the
county plan. U.S. BUREAU OF PUB ASSI9TANCE, FSA, REPORT NO. 16, MEDICAL
CARE IN PUBLIC ASSISTANCE, pt. I, Minn. Report 1 (1948). The Minnesota scheme
of general assistance is reviewed in JACOBSON, PUBLIC RELIEF AND LEGAL SETTLE-
WENT IN MINNESOTA (1945). It apnears to have engendered the greatest amount
of appellate litigation of any plan of this type.
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As.interpreted by the Minnesota court, the effect of the statute is to
aivoid~any problems of intent"5 or continuity76 The applicant's settle-
ment is the place where he in fact resided the longest"l during the
two-year period next preceding the date upon which he applied for
assistance.78
- To a certain extent the Minnesota system, and statutes like it, seem
.. Te "basic plan of the statute is to provide for the acquisition of settlements
at the municipal,'the county, and the state levels. If the county has adopted the
town. system, the statute appears to award a settlement in the municipality of
longest residence, provided that the individual has lived somewhere in the state
fdr two years. County settlement, on the other hand, is acquired only in a county
in which the individual has resided two years, with the exception that if the in-
dividual has a two-year state residence he will have a settlement in the county
in which he has longest resided, if he has not resided in any county for a two-
year period. MINN. STAT. ANN. § .261.07(1) (West Supp. 1954). Theefore,
applicants without two years of residence in the state will apparently not have a
settlement anywhere. If an individual has lived in several counties it would seem
that there is a greater chance that the cost of his care will fall on a-county having
the county system. The county, of course, is the larger geographical unit and the
individual may have moved from place to place within one county for a consider-
able period of time. It is readily apparent that the complications which result
under the Minnesota statute are a consequence of the optional county or town
iysteihs under which relief is administered. Wisconsin is the only other state
which appears to have retained this plan. WIS. STAT. §§ 49.02, 49.03 (1953).
75. Town of Smiley v. Village of St. Hilaire, 183 Minn. 533, 237 N.W. 416(1931)'. The case involved the settlement of a transitory individual and thus the
interpretation-of the words "longest resided" in the statute. However, the court
also indicated that it would place the same interpretation on the words "continu-
ously .resided." But cf. Town of Albion v. Village of Maple Lake, 71 Minn. 503,
'74 N.W. 282 (1898).
76. Minneapolis v. Village of Brooklyn Center, 223 Minn. 498, 27 N.W.2d 563(1947); City of Detroit Lakes v. Village of Litchfield, 200 linn. 349, 274 N.W.
236 (1937). Since the place where the individual has "longest resided" is the
place of settlement, continuity is not important and periods of residence separated
from one another by periods of absence may therefore be "tacked" together to
determine which locality is the place of settlement under the statute.
77. In addition to the cases cited in the previous footnote, see In re Stewart
216 Blinn. 485, 13 N.W.2d 375 (1944); County of Douglas v. Township of Dead
Lake, 179 Minn. 251, 228 N.W. 929 (1930). JACOBSON, op. cit. supra note 74, at
62-66, contends, in view of local legislative history, that it is still possible to
acquire a permanent local settlement by residing in a given locality for the statu-
tory period. This possibility appears to have been rejected in part in Minneapolis
v. Village of Brooklyn Center, 223 Minn. 498, 27 N.W.2d 563 (1947). This case
held that local settlement depends solely on the place where the individual has
longest resided within the two-year period immediately preceding the application
for relief, regardless of whether he might have resided for several years prior to
this time in some other locality within the county. However, once a settlement
has been acquired by a residence of two years or more in one township in one
county, it may not be lost by a residence in another county, or by a residence in
another township in another county having the township system, unless, in either
event, the individual has resided for two years in the other county. County of
Ramsey v. Township of Lake Henry, 234 Minn. 119, 47 N.W.2d 554 (1951). See
also .Town of Hagen v. Town of Felton, .197 Minn. 567, 247 N.W. 484 (1936).
The provisions of the Minnesota statute relating to county settlement would also
seem to indicate that it is possible to acquire a permanent county settlement by
two years' residence, which is then to govern the right of the applicant to as-
sistance unless it is subsequently lost. For cases reaching a similar result under
the similar North Dakota law, see City of Enderlin v. Pontiac Township, 62 N.D.
105, 242 N.W. 117. (1932); Kost v. Sheridan County, 46 N.D. 75, 179 N.W. 703(1920).
.78. See,. e.g., Application of Town of Iona, 212 Minn. 331, 3 N.W.2d 490
-(1942).
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arbitrary, as they impose the assistance burden on a municipality in
which the individual might have resided only a few months. Another
municipality, in which he might have resided for a considerable length
of time, but prior to the two-year period which the statute selects as
determinative, may escape all responsibility. In the long run, how-
ever, it would be expected that the cost of assistance among the various
municipalities would balance.
But this is what the proponents of the repeal of settlement laws
contend. If assistance costs will balance out without the benefit of
a settlement requirement, there seems to be no need for a provision
like that in Minnesota which is aimed at accomplishing the same
result. Such a system retains all the administrative headaches of
determining settlement, judging at least from the amount of litigation
in that state, while it does not afford the municipality the protection
a settlement law is supposed to give. On closer analysis, then, the
Minnesota system and statutes like it do not really solve the problems
posed by settlement requirements. Rather than adopt such a system
it would seem better, as indicated earlier, to abolish settlement and
handle the financial problems of cities and localities faced with a large
transient relief load through a system of grants.
In summary, then, the rules that have been adopted to determine
whether an individual has acquired a settlement by residence, because
of the intent, permanency of residence, and continuity requirements,
have imported a qualitative as well as a quantitive factor into settle-
ment law. Not only must an individual reside in the community for
the prescribed statutory period, but the nature of his residence must
be of a type which meets with the approval of the court.
For this reason, the rules adopted by the courts to cover these prob-
lems are not as important as the findings of fact which they enable
administrators and triers of fact to adopt. Since the rules are am-
biguous enough to permit considerable latitude in the selection of the
controlling facts, the real principles applied in these cases will have
to be looked for elsewhere, in terms of the meanings behind the fact
evaluations that are made. Little can be accomplished in this direction
from a reading of judicial opinions, except to reiterate the tendency
of some courts to deny a settlement to transient persons. While the
rule that every person must have a settlement somewhere 9 may miti-
gate the harshness of this approach, it has often been modified by
statute, with the result that many people in this group may be without
a settlement.
79. For a discussion of this rule, and a treatment of further problems regard-
ing the acquisition and loss of original and derivative settlements, see the second
Cart of this article in the February 1956 issue of the WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
W QUARTERLY.
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